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Statement of Purpose and Background 
 
 The primary document of the modern international chemical weapons regime is the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, a relatively recent law that has yet to be fully implemented. But 
what was the groundwork for this law? What was the crucial time where the elements that would 
later be part of the Chemical Weapons Convention fell into place? The history of chemical 
weapons law goes back a long time, with codified laws emerging at the beginning of the 20th 
century. The preeminent law on the subject was the Geneva Protocol of 1925. However, the 
United States did not ratify that treaty. Therefore, when the United States made a serious push to 
ratify the treaty much later, in the late 1960s, there was much discussion among American 
statesmen, publicists, and scientists on what the future of the international chemical weapons 
regime should be. It is instructive to compare the path of chemical weapons law to other attempts 
at arms limitation, since the concerns about chemical weapons were not the same as for other 
classes of weapons, and if future lawmaking took those concerns seriously, we would expect to 
see a different regime emerge. It appears that the crucial time in the development of the law was 
from the late 1960s to the United States’ ratification of the Geneva Protocol during the Ford 
administration. Indeed, when one looks at the writings of the thinkers of the 1960s and 1970s, 
one sees that subsequent events touched upon or addressed the same problems that then worried 
them. Had the United States ratified the Geneva Protocol earlier, it is quite possible that the 
international chemical weapons regime would look very different than it does today. 
 What reason do we have for thinking that there was something especially important about 
the Nixon era? L. Craig Johnstone, in a Foreign Affairs article from 1971, asserts that the Nixon 
administration’s policies on chemical and biological weapons and the military’s plans for the end 
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of ecological warfare in Vietnam “contributed significantly to international efforts to reach 
agreement on prohibiting chemical and biological warfare” (712). This statement holds up well 
today, although we now can write with the benefit of hindsight and thus can say exactly to where 
the Nixon administration’s efforts led. At the time, one can surmise that the major issue was the 
United States’ potential ratification of the Geneva Protocol. After all, the United States was 
unusual in not being party to the treaty (Johnstone 712). In addition, Nixon was revivifying the 
Protocol after years of neglect, with Truman being the last president to attempt to see it passed 
(Johnstone 712). But the accession to the Geneva Protocol by the United States was ultimately 
irrelevant. The Geneva Protocol represented the old international chemical weapons regime. That 
the United States had never formally joined it was a matter of some importance, to be sure, but 
we now know that it was merely a stepping-stone on the way to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. What therefore matters more than the text of the Geneva Protocol itself are the 
debates that arose because of Nixon’s push for U. S. ratification, since it is possible that these 
debates had a direct effect on the formation of the later treaties on chemical and biological 
weapons. If there is no direct effect, then one can at least take the debates as one part of the 
international movement for a more robust international chemical weapons regime that later found 
its culmination in the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
 
History of the Law Before the 1960s 
 
Before the Geneva Protocol 
 To understand the debates of the 1960s and 1970s, one must understand how the history 
of thought on chemical weapons limitation prior to that point. While most scholars date the 
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beginning of the international chemical weapons regime to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, we 
have good reason to think that there was a less comprehensive regime in place much earlier. For 
example, the prohibition on poison was stated by ancient authors such as Cicero (Moon 657). 
Early modern international law theorists such as Hugo Grotius and Emmerich de Vattel later 
reiterated that same prohibition (Moon 658). While the technology used in modern chemical 
weapons may therefore be only of contemporary concern, the moral and legal ramifications of 
weapons of that sort are not exclusively a modern preoccupation. De Vattel, in his denunciation 
of the use of poison, made two arguments that have persisted to the present day: first, that any 
initial use of poison (or chemical weapons) will invite reprisal by the other side, and second, that 
these weapons are of such brutal character that to use them at all is a moral offense (Moon 658f). 
We can see this idea of biological and chemical weapons as particularly cruel persist even after 
the development of nuclear weapons; in fact, one member of the United States Congress 
specifically named a nuclear strike as preferable to the use of biological agents (McCarthy 682). 
 As the codification of international law began, there were sensibly some attempts to 
codify the international regime on biological and chemical warfare. This coincided with the 
explosive growth in technology in the 19th and 20th centuries that made these weapons more 
dangerous than ever. J. K. Miettinen notes that this advance in technology led to treaties in 1889 
and 1907, the Hague Conventions, that sought to ban chemical weapons (37). However, these 
treaties were ineffective, and “12,000 tons of tear gases and over 100,000 tons of more toxic 
agents were used” in the First World War (Miettinen 37). While this went counter to the 
longstanding prohibition against weapons of this type, one could surmise that the technological 
progress was so rapid that nobody really knew how monstrous these weapons would be. As 
Rivero/4 
 
Miettinen notes, a strong consensus that the use of chemical weapons was immoral emerged 
following the widespread calamity of the war (37). 
 
The Purpose of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 
 The document that laid the foundation of the international chemical weapons regime for 
roughly seventy years is the Geneva Protocol of 1925. What makes this law so significant, other 
than its longevity? In many ways, it is quite peculiar. It does not fall easily into the categories of 
“arms control” or “disarmament.” Rather, it prohibits the “use in war” of chemical and 
bacteriological weapons, but not the testing or stockpiling of them (Baxter and Buergenthal 2). 
Nineteen countries ratified the treaty with reservations to the effect that it is only valid under 
conditions of reciprocity, which as Baxter and Buergenthal note, weakens the case that such an 
interpretation was widely viewed as obvious from the text of the Protocol (19). Nevertheless, this 
does show that there was not a consensus in the international community concerning a restriction 
on both first and second uses of chemical and bacteriological weapons.  
 
The United States and the Geneva Protocol 
 While the United States did not ratify the Geneva Protocol in 1925, it did sign the 
protocol at the conference in which it was adopted (Moore 421). This indicates that the United 
States agreed in principle with the provisions of the treaty. John Norton Moore states that the 
United States did not ratify the treaty because of “inadequate coordination with the Senate” (421). 
That description lends further credence to the idea that the United States was committed at the 
time to the principles outlined in the Protocol, and that its failure to ratify was more of a 
domestic political issue than a fundamental disagreement on policy. As we have seen, however, 
Rivero/5 
 
it was only briefly reconsidered under Truman and not taken up seriously until the Nixon 
administration. There is no good reason to suspect that during this period the United States had 
changed its mind with regard to the principles of the Protocol; indeed, many close U. S. allies in 
this period were signatories, as was its chief enemy, the Soviet Union. Baxter and Buergenthal 
go so far as to state that “all the military and industrial nations of the world” as of 1970 had 
signed it (2). While the United States lagged behind the prevailing international community on 
paper, it is hard to substantiate the claim that it differed significantly in philosophy. It is because 
the United States shared a common philosophical ground with the rest of the international 
community that it was able to become a major player in the proliferation debates of the 1970s. 
 
Problems of the Geneva Protocol 
 
Problems with the Treaty Itself 
 However, if we can presume that the position of the United States represented a 
commonly agreed upon perspective of the prevailing international law of the time, then it is as 
important to look at what the United States did not believe as what it did. Richard D. McCarthy, 
a member of the United States Congress, gave a speech in 1969 where he elucidated the U. S. 
government’s position on the proper role of chemical weapons. He relates an official saying that 
the United States aims “to develop and maintain a defensive chemical-biological capability so 
that our military forces could operate for some period of time in a toxic environment if 
necessary; to develop and maintain a limited offensive capability in order to deter all use of 
chemical and biological weapons by the threat of retaliation in kind” (McCarthy 681). The 
striking bit from this quotation is the idea of an offensive chemical or biological weapons force, 
Rivero/6 
 
exactly that which is prohibited under current international law. One may assume that the United 
States could take that position because it was not a signatory to the Geneva Protocol. However, 
that is not so; as we have seen, the stockpiling or testing of chemical weapons was not prohibited 
by the Protocol. 
 Furthermore, McCarthy notes that the presence of a biological weapons stockpile not 
only allows for a second strike, but also could give the capability for a first strike (681). Indeed, 
he thought that the policy of developing biological weapons was in part in order to have this first 
strike capability (681), although he later doubts whether the system of reprisals would work at all, 
since he doubts that the United States would be willing to make a second strike as long as other 
weapons were available (682). A first strike would, of course, be illegal under the Geneva 
Protocol, and as we have seen, the United States was not inclined to violate the Geneva Protocol 
even though it had not ratified it, since it agreed in principle with the provisions of the Protocol. 
But if the possibility of a first strike was conceivable under the Geneva Protocol regime, then it 
would be open alike to those who had signed the Protocol and those who had not, as long as the 
state using the weapons would feel confident that there would be no reprisal. It is important to 
note that while McCarthy was talking about biological weapons, the provisions of the Geneva 
Protocol were the same for chemical weapons and thus the same problem arises. If the Soviet 
Union has a chemical weapons stockpile, under this scenario, the United States or France or 
Britain cannot be sure that the weapons are truly for use in a second strike, or if they are being 
held for a potential first strike. This same difficulty arose with nuclear weapons in this period. 
However, the international community chose a different strategy in formulating the law 
concerning nuclear weapons. The differences between the two strategies are instructive in 
showing how chemical weapons differ from nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and on the other 
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hand how different legal regimes can address similar problems. First, however, we must consider 
why the United States did not ratify the Protocol. 
 
Problems with Ratification by the United States 
 We know that the United States was hesitant to join the Geneva Protocol in 1925, and no 
serious movement on the issue occurred until the Nixon administration. There is good reason to 
think that Nixon’s push to ratify the Protocol in 1969 helped galvanize international opinion in 
the direction that a stronger prohibition on chemical weapons was possible, primarily through his 
tough language on the closely related subject of biological weapons (Meselson 14). The specifics 
of Nixon’s statement are worth going into, but for the moment, the important thing is that the 
push toward the modern international chemical weapons regime did not begin until the late 
1960s, and that the United States’ actions were important in this development. 
 In addition, the United States probably wanted to abide by the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. It did not ratify this convention; however, President Nixon signed it, indicating 
that the United States agreed in principle with the treaty. The reason it did not pass the Senate 
was that there was a dispute over the precise interpretation of the word “treaty” (Dalton et al. 
276). Nevertheless, the United States took the position that it considered some provisions of the 
Vienna Convention to have the force of customary law for the United States (Dalton et al. 277). 
Why would the United States want to enter into a reservation when ratifying the Geneva 
Protocol? Since the United States had used tear gas and herbicides in Vietnam, there was a 
debate at the time about whether the United States would have been in violation of the Geneva 
Protocol (had it been a party to it). The United States claimed that this was consistent with the 
law, while the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution stating otherwise (Baxter 
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and Buergenthal 13). This may have delayed the ratification of the treaty, since at the time it was 
not clear whether the Soviet Union would accept a reservation to the effect that the Protocol does 
not prohibit herbicides and tear gas. If the Soviet Union did not accept, under the law of treaties 
the Soviet Union would not be bound by the terms of the protocol with respect to the United 
States (Baxter and Buergenthal 27). In addition, the Nixon administration made it clear that 
under its interpretation, the Protocol did not prohibit these chemicals, which was not an 
acceptable position to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Therefore, the Protocol was not 
ratified until the Ford administration, when the treaty was ratified without a reservation 
concerning herbicides and tear gas. Indeed, the Ford administration rejected first use of 
herbicides and riot-control agents under most circumstances, which was sufficient for the 
Foreign Relations Committee; it did not, however, change the United States’ position that the 
text of the treaty does not prohibit them (U. S. State Department). 
 
The Concurrent Development of the Biological Weapons Regime 
 
Biological Weapons and the Nixon Administration 
 While working toward the passage of the Geneva Protocol, Nixon made some progress 
on biological weapons as well. In addition to renouncing the use of biological weapons, he 
renounced their possession (Johnstone 711). This presages not only the Biological Weapons 
Convention, but also the Chemical Weapons Convention of much later. Obviously, however, 
Nixon could not make as strong a statement with regard to chemical weapons. As long as the 
debate about herbicides and tear gas raged, he was unlikely to make any progress—one needs a 
clear definition of chemical weapons first. In addition, at the same time when he forswore the 
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possession of biological weapons, he “reaffirmed the renunciation by the United States of the 
first use of lethal chemical weapons” (Johnstone 711), thereby leaving open the option of a 
second use of lethal chemical weapons. If the United States was to keep the option of second use 
on the table, that means that it was the view of the United States that second use of chemical 
weapons was an appropriate reprisal to a first use. This is in line with a common interpretation of 
the Geneva Protocol that we have seen and accepted practice with treaties regarding war in 
general (Baxter and Buergenthal 19). However, the Nixon administration’s stronger position is 
telling. It may be an indication more generally that the international community was moving 
toward the idea that the use of certain weapons constitutes a human rights issue, and that merely 
to possess the weapons is too great a threat to international peace for the international 
community to countenance. These views would receive more concrete support in the Biological 
Weapons Convention. 
 
The Development of the Biological Weapons Convention 
 The Stanford Arms Control group notes that while biological weapons have not proven 
themselves especially useful in war, chemical weapons “have relatively well-proved tactical 
applications” (116). Thus, while the problem of controlling chemical weapons may appear on the 
surface to be the same as the problem of controlling biological weapons, we should not be 
surprised that after the Geneva Protocol they developed separately. Because chemical weapons 
are more effective in war, states may be more hesitant to give them up. They may also require 
greater confidence that unfriendly powers will not use them before they will be willing to disarm. 
 It is perhaps for this reason that the arguments about the problems of the Geneva Protocol 
found themselves addressed first with regard to biological weapons, and only later with regard to 
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chemical weapons. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) makes it clear that the use of 
biological weapons in war, even as a reprisal, is forbidden, and furthermore uses the term 
“biological” in order to expand upon the scope of the Geneva Protocol’s term “bacteriological” 
(Paris 518). In some respects, this is reminiscent of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 
since it forbids the stockpiling of biological weapons much like the NPT forbids states from 
building or attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. However, the BWC does not grandfather in 
states that currently have the weapons, unlike the NPT. This may stem from the weakness of 
biological weapons relative to nuclear weapons, making states less worried about giving up their 
weapons. It also may stem from the long-standing moral prohibition of forms of biological and 
chemical warfare, a norm that predates the invention of nuclear weaponry. While the moral issue 
does not obviously separate chemical weapons from biological weapons, the efficacy issue does, 
which may explain the delay in adoption of a similar treaty for chemical weapons. 
 
From the 1970s to the Current Chemical Weapons Regime 
 
How Chemical Weapons Law Is Distinct 
 When the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was finally adopted, it differed in one 
important respect from the BWC. It had something called the “Verification Annex” that dealt 
with inspections to ensure that states are complying with the treaty, which Kristin Paris calls “the 
most comprehensive verification scheme of any international treaty” (545). Part of the reason 
why this might be so is that the CWC was adopted many years after the BWC. Another reason, 
however, may be the greater utility in war of chemical weapons as opposed to biological 
weapons. Since a state may see more to gain from using chemical weapons, it may also see more 
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to gain in being certain that nobody is surreptitiously stockpiling them. It is notable that the main 
controversies over the accession of the United States to the Geneva Protocol concerned riot-
control chemicals and herbicidal chemicals; the precise classification of biological weapons was 
not at issue. Finally, the Geneva Protocol regime had already found itself wanting in the realm of 
chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War and the proliferation of chemical weapons in the 1980s 
(U. S. State Department). No similar problem had confronted the BWC regime during that time. 
Therefore, we can say that while the issue of biological weapons was in some ways an easier 
problem, and recognized as such early on, that may have paradoxically led to a worse treaty. 
 How does this compare to nuclear weapons law? The progression of the chemical 
weapons regime differed significantly from the progression of the nuclear weapons regime in 
two ways. First, the important treaties on chemical weapons (the Geneva Protocol and the CWC) 
were both multilateral treaties. There are important multilateral treaties in the field of nuclear 
weapons (the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the NPT, the Outer Space Treaty, and the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty, for example), but the primary work on arms control and disarmament was done 
through the cooperation of the world’s two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. 
We see the fruits of that cooperation in SALT, for arms control, and in START, for disarmament. 
This indicates that chemical weapons were less of a cold war issue than nuclear weapons, and the 
preoccupation by all scholars with the Geneva Protocol makes this very clear—the issue of 
chemical weapons predates the creation of chemical weapons and the postwar international order, 
although it certainly was not without effect in that order. Second, the statesmen, publicists, and 
scientists of the late 1960s and early 1970s were already exploring the possibility of disarmament 
with regard to chemical weapons, and in fact achieved a treaty concerning disarmament in the 
closely-related subject of biological weapons. However, there was no progress in nuclear 
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disarmament until START and the end of the cold war; while the cold war remained, there could 
be little hope of disarmament. Therefore, while we have seen that the distinctions between 
biological and chemical weapons were important, and that in turn they shared a certain moral 
condemnation that did not immediately appear in the case of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons 
law and nuclear weapons law differed because of differing historical circumstance. We can say 
that the legal thinkers of the 1960s and 1970s used the historical situation that was given to them 
and attempted to come up with the best solution that they could; in the case of chemical weapons, 
it was a more radical solution than for nuclear weapons, even if they did not succeed in 
implementing it until the 1990s for reasons previously discussed. 
 
Problems for the Future 
 The Chemical Weapons Convention attempts to address the problems that concerned the 
writers of the 1960s and 1970s. However, is it effective in doing that? While the current law on 
chemical weapons is very clear on paper, one must look at the results in order to determine its 
effectiveness. It is simple to require that states dismantle their chemical weapons stockpiles, and 
it is another thing altogether actually to do this. A complete study of the results of the CWC is 
outside the scope of this paper, but the response of the United States at least is encouraging. The 
Army has plans in place to eliminate the United States’ chemical weapons stockpile; although 
these plans were challenged under environmental law, a district court upheld the Army’s position 
(“Court Rejects Challenge” 3.4). Thus we can see the problems of disarmament: it may take a 
long time (the case was from 2009, over a decade following the CWC going into effect), and it 
may conflict with other laws, further extending the legal process. The overall impression one 
gets, however, is positive, since it appears quite likely that all the weapons will be destroyed. It 
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also speaks positively for disarmament, in a roundabout way: if destroying the weapons causes 
environmental problems, then that strengthens the case that the weapons should never have been 
produced in the first place and are too dangerous to allow. Nevertheless, not all indicators point 
toward a happy resolution to the chemical weapons issue. The United States had already said that 
it would fail to meet the 2012 deadline for the destruction of its chemical weapons, and the other 
biggest possessor, Russia, announced this year that it likewise would not make the deadline 
(Horner 43). Thus, we can say that while the principal issues that beguiled the Nixon and Ford 
administrations have been resolved on the level of norms, there may still be additional progress 
required in the development of international law before the chemical weapons regime reaches its 
final state. What reform happens, if it happens at all, in part depends on the continued application 
of the CWC. If it succeeds, then it will stand out as one of the most impressive victories for 
disarmament, and for the intellectual groundwork that made it possible. 
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